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Reviewed by David Burk
Failing Law Schools is not the right title for Professor Brian Tamanaha’s book. 
A better one might be, The Sad Fate of Poor Performers at Low-Ranked Law 
Schools. It is not as catchy, but gives a better idea of what the book is about. 
Better still would be to excise the sections about how law school is a bad deal, 
and call the remaining portion Why Law School is So Expensive and What to 
Do About It, because the book does a fine job of answering those questions.
Tamanaha’s casting of law schools as failing their students is problematic 
for at least two reasons. First, it seems unlikely that the problem he sees—
law school is a bad investment for many of its students—will persist. Law 
students, after all, choose to go to law school. If law school were obviously 
such a bad investment, they would choose to do something else. Second, 
of the various victims of the legal education system, it is not clear that law 
graduates are the ones most in need of help. The legal education system has 
been implicated in, for example, the vast unmet legal needs of the lower class, 
as well as the staggering amounts of taxpayer dollars spent on litigation. From 
a social welfare perspective, these failings surely trump the indebtedness of 
law school graduates.
It is clear that law school is expensive. The book tells the story of how it 
came to be so expensive in an engaging, almost breathtaking way. This review 
will give a more detailed summary, but the essential reason is that the legal 
education system suffers from perverse regulations. Additionally, the book 
explains the widespread practice of ranking-chasing among law schools and 
how it affects tuition levels. Tamanaha is unduly harsh on rankings, but he 
does present fascinating evidence on the wasteful behavior they induce.
The argument that law school is a bad deal, however, is weak. Tamanaha 
presents some interesting summary statistics that do suggest that recent crops 
of law graduates struggle with high debt and high legal-joblessness rates. 
But this may be due to a bad period in the legal labor market, and does not 
imply that law schools are shortchanging their students in the long run—after 
all, a lawyer’s career is long. Furthermore, Tamanaha does not explain why 
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if law school is such a bad deal, it is a deal so many students take.. Certainly 
there are law graduates who, because of their heavy debt and poor financial 
management skills, regret their decision to attend. These remorseful souls are 
deserving of sympathy in the same way that underwater mortgage holders are. 
It is a shame they bought the house. But it is naive to blame the seller.
Despite the failure to adequately establish his pet problem, Tamanaha’s 
ideas for reform are sensible and would address some of his concerns—the lack 
of low-cost legal education, for example—while also addressing problems with 
the broader legal system, like the unmet legal needs of the poor. In a word, he 
urges immediate deregulation.
This review intersperses summary with critique. It develops the criticisms 
highlighted above, and raises several additional points. It proceeds in the 
same topical order as the book. The first part describes how law professors 
have captured the law school regulatory body, the American Bar Association 
(ABA), and the effects of this capture on students. The second part discusses law 
schools’ obeisance to the U.S. News & World Report rankings, and the inefficient 
maneuvering it induces. Third, it considers the dirty practice of awarding 
scholarships. Fourth, it describes legal education’s “broken economic model.” 
It concludes with a comment on Tamanaha’s ideas for reform, which, despite 
the book’s shortcomings, are sensible.
Law School Regulation
In the first section of the book, Tamanaha’s basic argument is that law 
professors exert great influence over the accreditation process, and have used 
this influence to further their own interests at the expense of their students. 
This section of the book makes for a good case study of regulatory capture. 
That said, Tamanaha may be too quick to condemn some of the specific 
practices the standards codify. An understanding of what constitutes the ideal 
legal education environment—which the standards supposedly aim to secure—
requires a clear understanding of how legal education works. The book also 
fails to mention the anticompetitive effects of the accreditation standards.
Law school accreditation standards, written by the ABA, are largely 
designed and enforced by law professors. Unsurprisingly, the standards 
include components that benefit law professors at the expense of the students. 
This is not merely Tamanaha’s perspective. In 1995, the Department of Justice 
brought an antitrust complaint against the ABA, claiming that legal educators 
had subverted the accreditation process. At the time, ABA enforcement 
panels were “typically composed entirely of law faculty…. What accreditation 
amounted to was legal educators going around the country to school after 
school advancing the interests of fellow legal educators” (13). The standards 
seemed designed to improve professors’ lives rather than to ensure a quality 
legal education: they lightened course loads, increased funding for research, 
and increased salaries. Since the Justice Department’s lawsuit, Tamanaha 
asserts that “the blatant use of accreditation to benefit faculty is in the past” 
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(18). However, he argues that the faculty-exalting effects of the old standards 
linger. 
For example, Tamanaha argues that because of the research emphasis 
embedded in the former standards, scholarship remains an important function 
of law professors. Tenure-track positions, and tenure itself, is determined 
largely by publication records. Accordingly, to attract good faculty, schools 
must offer them funding and time to conduct research. Funding this research 
has become increasingly expensive—a cost that gets passed on to students as 
higher tuitions. Adding insult to injury, much of this costly scholarship goes 
unread. 
Tamanaha blames the increasing cost of research on the further self-interested 
maneuverings of the faculty. He does not consider that the increased emphasis 
on scholarship may instead be the consequence of some competitive process. 
If scholarship is unimportant, why is it that law schools have increased their 
funding of it, even without any prodding from a change in the accreditation 
standards?
To critique specific aspects of the legal education system, as Tamanaha 
critiques the institution of faculty scholarship, for example, it is useful to 
have a clear understanding of how legal education works. That is, how does 
law school produce lawyers? Two competing theories of education include 
the human capital theory and the signaling theory of education.1 The human 
capital theory posits that education endows a student with new skills which 
enhance his productivity—a student benefits from law school because of the 
things he learns there. The signaling theory, on the other hand, sees education 
as revealing which students are more inherently productive—a Yale degree is 
valuable not because of the Yale training, but instead because it reveals the 
degree-holder to have superior innate abilities. A third theory might stress the 
importance of social networks developed at school. Which theory, or what 
combination of theories, best describes legal training is an empirical question.
Consider the signaling theory of education, which deemphasizes what 
students are taught and who teaches it, and instead sees a particular alma 
mater or GPA as constituting a quality signal to prospective employers. 
Under this theory, corporate law firms value Harvard JD’s not because they 
value Harvard’s training, but because the fact that a person made it into and 
through Harvard suggests that the person will be a good lawyer. This theory 
is supported by the notion that neither employers nor students value the 
third year of legal education. In fact many students secure job offers before 
beginning the third year. The degree is valuable as a necessary credential, and 
the name brand is valuable as a signal of the quality of the applicant.
If law school functions primarily as a signal, then faculty scholarship, even 
scholarship that goes virtually unread, may serve a purpose that Tamanaha 
1. See, for example Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
with Special Reference to Education (Univ. of Chicago Press 1994), for the human capital 
theory, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of “Screening,” Education, and the Distribution 
of Income, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 283, 283-300 (1975), for the signaling theory. 
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does not appreciate. Perhaps in order to attract the best students, and therefore 
establish the best signal, a school must hire the best faculty. Publication 
records serve as a metric by which to rate faculty. The fact that law schools 
with the most sought after students also have the strongest faculty is consistent 
with this hypothesis. 
There is at least one negative effect of the standards that Tamanaha does 
not explicitly consider. It is that the accreditation standards stifle competition 
in the market for law schools. Some standards, such as the requirement for 
an extensive library or the imposition of pay standards for faculty, may serve 
as insurmountable barriers to entry for would-be new law schools. More 
cynically, law school accreditors may deny accreditation to new schools, even 
when they meet the standards. This stifling of competition has various adverse 
effects, one of which is keeping tuition high.2 Deregulation is often good for 
the consumers, which in this case are law students.
Rankings
Tamanaha is vicious in his attack on the U.S. News & World Report rankings of 
law schools: “The annual pronouncement of the surviving rump of a defunct 
magazine thus mercilessly lords over legal academia” (79). This section of 
the book documents a wide range of wasteful and even dishonest behaviors 
that schools have engaged in to improve their ranking. Ultimately Tamanaha 
condemns the entire system: “U.S. News ranking competition has wrought 
profound detrimental changes,” he writes, blaming the rankings for “the loss 
of moral credibility suffered by law schools” (85). However, he fails to consider 
the possibility that ranking serve a useful purpose. 
The U.S. News rankings carry great importance in the legal education 
system. The book cites a statistical study that shows a rise in the rankings 
brings more and better applicants, and a fall in the rankings has the opposite 
effect. However, the strongest evidence that rankings matter, for elite and non-
elite schools alike, is the fact that many schools engage in costly behavior to 
affect their ranking. 
Several schools have been caught misrepresenting their students’ LSAT 
scores and employment outcomes, both important components of the U.S. 
News ranking algorithm. Intentional misrepresentation is of course detestable, 
although it is impossible to say how widespread the practice is, especially 
after several schools have been caught and duly punished. The damage to 
these schools’ reputations, along with the subsequent increase in oversight of 
reporting practices went a long way to stamping out future dishonest reporting. 
Concern about rankings encourages behavior that Tamanaha sees as 
wasteful. For example, he is very bothered by the market in transfer students 
that has developed. An important determinant of a school’s rank is the median 
LSAT score of the entering class. Transfer students’ scores do not figure in 
this statistic, and thus a transfer student provides a school a way of receiving 
2. Some other adverse effects are mentioned in the conclusion of this review.
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the tuition of a relatively poor performer without receiving the pockmark of 
his low test scores. Higher-ranked schools lure away the best students from 
lower-ranking schools. This is a problem, according to Tamanaha, for several 
reasons. This transfer practice robs lower-ranked schools of their best students, 
and leaves the lowest-ranked schools with too many open seats. Students who 
do transfer do not really benefit from the superior education at the new law 
school, as they miss the crucial first year when the core of instruction occurs 
and valuable social networks form.
Tamanaha’s concerns about this transfer phenomenon are overblown. First, 
the students who do transfer are presumably better off. Second, a school’s 
concern for its reputation will prevent it from accepting substandard students 
just for the sake of getting their tuition. In fact, it is likely that transfer students 
improve the average quality of the classes they join. After all, transfer students 
have proven that they are excellent law students. Furthermore, students who 
do not transfer may actually benefit from losing their best classmates, insofar 
as class rank is important for obtaining a job.
Schools’ tuition-reduction practices present another case of Tamanaha 
seeing a problem where there is none. Rather than preserving scholarships 
for students with financial needs, schools use scholarships to lure in students 
who would otherwise attend other schools. Tamanaha worries about these 
scholarships as forcing students to make difficult decisions—for example, 
attending Iowa at half-tuition or Vanderbilt at full-tuition. He is concerned that 
this financial temptation to forgo a spot at a higher ranked school differentially 
affects the poor, and pushes them to lower quality schools, since the offer of 
half-tuition is more appealing to a poor student than a rich student. 
Again, Tamanaha’s concern is misplaced. If the better school garners the 
student better job opportunities, a student, rich or poor, of course would be 
willing to pay more for it. If a student thinks he could get a higher-paying job 
from attending Vanderbilt than Iowa, rich or poor, it would make sense, at 
least on income-maximizing grounds, for him to take the Vanderbilt spot if 
the expected pay differential justified the tuition differential. This is perhaps 
tempered by the uncertainty involved in obtaining a job, but the broader point 
stands: the quality of an investment is independent of the resources of the 
investor.
Other rankings-induced wasteful behavior involves the “reputation score.” 
This score, the single most important factor in the U.S. News rankings, is 
determined by fellow academics and practitioners. Thus to boost its score, 
a school must improve its public image. This prompts schools to offer huge 
salaries to hire away star professors from other schools, even when it is not in 
the best interest of its students. Reputational concern also leads schools to 
overspend on marketing and promotional materials.
Through his tirade against rankings, Tamanaha fails to realize that rankings 
do serve a useful purpose—he considers the costs but not the benefits. From 
both the student’s and the employer’s perspective, information about various 
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law schools is diffuse. A ranking system serves to consolidate this information, 
thereby lowering search costs, and facilitating better matches of both students 
to schools and graduates to employers. Just imagine how applying to law 
school and hiring new lawyers would work without any way of gauging a 
school’s relative quality.
Any ranking system will be susceptible to some degree of gaming by law 
schools. This wasteful behavior on the part of law schools is lamentable, but 
also inevitable. It is the cost of having a ranking system. The book undertakes 
the task of documenting the costs of the current ranking system. The remaining 
task is to devise—and implement—a better one.
The Broken Economic Model
The discussion of tuition reductions segues into a discussion of the costs 
and benefits of law school. Tamanaha’s key contention is that law school, with 
its high cost and uncertain outcome, is a bad investment for many students. 
He supports this claim with an appeal to some basic summary statistics. He 
does not, however, adequately explain why students keep signing up for law 
school. Alas, he fails to persuade.
Tuition has risen very quickly, and debt levels have climbed in lockstep. 
In 2010, the average debt of new law school graduates was $100,000, while 
the average starting salary for lawyers was $77,000. Tamanaha considers a 
hypothetical case of a person who has slightly higher-than-average debt and 
a slightly-lower-than-average salary, and shows that she would have a difficult 
time paying off her loans. This bleak situation does not even account for the 
many graduates who are unable to secure jobs as lawyers.
Of course, it is not clear for how many people this hypothetical is 
representative. If students are not completely ignorant as to the costs and 
expected benefits of the law school investment, one would expect that 
graduates with higher-than-average debt tend to have higher-than-average 
salaries. The overall averages obscure this. It would be better to have data 
on the relationship between graduates’ debts and salaries, rather than just 
overall averages. The best Tamanaha can do is present overall averages from 
several individual schools. Moreover, the statistical portrait based on 2010 
employment numbers exploits the sudden, and perhaps temporary, downturn 
in the legal labor market. Graduates of 2010 essentially decided to be lawyers 
in 2007, when the legal market was quite attractive. Many of those graduates 
were in for a rude surprise. This is not an indictment of a broken legal education 
system, but rather a reminder of the dynamic nature of labor markets. New law 
students in 2010 made their enrollment decision with the current legal labor 
market in mind, and their outcomes may be very different. Nonetheless, the 
assertion that there are many students who have high debt-to-income ratios is 
at least plausible.
The book discusses two government-funded avenues of debt relief. Under 
the loan extension plan, graduates may extend the payment plan on their 
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government loans from the typical 10-year plan to a 30-year plan, thereby 
lowering the monthly debt payments. The other program is the Income Based 
Repayment program (IBR). This program for low-income graduates reduces 
the monthly debt payments and completely forgives them after 25 years (or 
ten years for public service jobs). Qualifying as low-income depends on one’s 
debt. Some graduates who make over $100,000 per year qualify.
The take-up rate of these programs among law graduates is high, and 
Tamanaha sees this as a problem. He fails to consider that many law students 
landed in debt relief programs not by accident but by design. If a law school 
applicant knows about these programs—and some law schools advertise them 
when trying to assuage concerns about the tuition—then she realizes the 
effective cost of law school is well below the sticker price.
Tamanaha reckons that approximately half of 2010 graduates qualified for 
IBR, and takes this as “indicative of a serious problem with the economics 
of legal education” (121). But exactly the opposite is true. The popularity of 
IBR may be taken as evidence that the economics of legal education seem to 
be working just as one would expect. If students are aware of IBR then they 
sensibly view law school as cheaper than its nominal costs. IBR is particularly 
attractive for applicants who desire to work in public service. It would be 
surprising if students did not take advantage of such a generous program.
When evaluating whether law school is a good investment, it is the out-of-
pocket expense to the applicant that is relevant, not the nominal value of their 
loan. A $100,000 debt that will be forgiven after 10 years of small monthly 
payments is not a $100,000 debt at all. Therefore, for the student that takes 
IBR, law school will have been an excellent investment, regardless of the size 
of his debt upon graduation. The forward-looking student who plans to work 
in public service realizes before beginning law school that he doesn’t need to 
pay off the $100,000—he just needs to make manageable monthly payments 
for ten years. Suppose a person would have a salary of $4,000 a month and 
zero debt if he did not attend law school and $5,000 a month if he does attend 
law school. If his monthly debt payment is less than $1,000, then law school 
is a good investment. 
Perhaps Tamanaha does not think students are clever enough to figure out 
their options for financing their law school debts after graduation, noting, 
“unusual skill and skepticism on the part of a prospective student would be 
required to see through [the graduate outcome statistics the schools advertise]” 
(145). He believes law schools are intentionally misleading students. But 
Tamanaha should give the students more credit. Before making an investment 
of $150,000 and three prime working years, even gullible applicants do 
some research. This is particularly true after the spate of attention the issue 
of educational debt loads has received in the popular press. Additionally, 
there are blogs and websites devoted to law school financing and debt, not to 
mention the opinions and advice of every lawyer alive.
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This is not to say that every graduate made a good decision in attending 
law school. Tragic stories abound. These tragedies, however, serve to fix the 
system. The more tragic cases of students with enormous debt loads and no 
job prospects in one year, the fewer applicants the next. If law school is a bad 
deal, students will figure it out. 
Indeed, there are many signs that the legal education system is adapting, 
as Tamanaha himself documents. Applications have been on the decline 
since 2005. The most telling piece of evidence that applicants are aware of 
the changing soundness of an investment in law school is that applications 
did not spike in the 2008 recession, contrary to the historical regularity of 
an application boom during periods of high overall unemployment (161). 
Surely the dearth of applicants is bad news for existing law schools and their 
professors, particularly those that have failed to produce graduates who get 
jobs. But the failure of such schools is a sign of the economics of the legal 
education system functioning well, not poorly.
Conclusion
Whether or not law schools are failing, the legal education system certainly 
can be improved. Tamanaha finishes his book advocating various deregulatory 
measures. He argues that deregulation would bring about changes in the legal 
education landscape to make law school more accessible and more affordable 
for prospective attorneys. Indeed, deregulation would bring a host of other, 
perhaps more significant benefits, too. 
Tamanaha gives specific suggestions for how a less regulated educational 
system should work: drop the third year of law school; permit schools to rely 
on non-tenured, non-scholar instructors; don’t require law schools to maintain 
expensive brick-and-mortar libraries. Deregulatory measures such as these 
would allow schools to lower their tuitions to a fraction of their current levels. 
The Harvards and Yales might change very little, as their reputations rely on 
high-profile scholars who demand tenure and research budgets. But low-cost 
options for students with less ambitious goals would arise to meet the demand.
Alternatively, Tamanaha suggests the simpler yet more extreme change of 
dropping the requirement, present in most states, that lawyers hold a degree 
from an ABA-accredited school. This deregulation would facilitate even 
more competition, and provide more options for students. Any concern that 
unaccredited schools would produce unqualified lawyers could be addressed 
by the still-standing requirement that they pass the bar exam. In support of 
this suggestion, Tamanaha quotes a state supreme court justice: “No empirical 
data has been offered to suggest that the ABA standards correlate in any way 
to a quality legal education” (176).
Given his belief that the legal education system will persist in short-
changing its students—which betrays a lack of trust in the market mechanism—
it is surprising to encounter Tamanaha’s market-based ideas for reform. 
Certainly the accreditation standards prevent the market in law schools from 
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operating optimally, but the presence of regulation does not put on hold 
all of the workings of the market. If law school prices remain high and jobs 
remain scarce, would-be lawyers will see that law school is a bad deal, and 
will choose other careers. If the number of students declines sufficiently, some 
law schools—the poorest performers—will cut costs or shutter their doors. The 
legal labor market will hit a new equilibrium. This, of course, is standard Econ 
101 fare. But Tamanaha does not present any evidence to suggest it does not 
apply.
Keeping law school prices high is effectively a labor supply restriction. It 
is sometimes said, misleadingly, that there is an oversupply of lawyers. But 
there are also many unmet legal needs in this country. So the problem is not 
that there too many lawyers. It is that there are too many lawyers who insist at 
working at relatively high wages. If a law school graduate’s most lucrative job 
option is a non-legal job, it is not surprising that he should take it, particularly 
if he has a heavy debt burden.
The theory of labor supply restrictions has a long history in economics, 
originating perhaps with Milton Friedman’s doctoral thesis, published in 
1945. In it he argues that the American Medical Association, by restricting 
the supply of doctors, drove up the price of medicine. This of course was 
good for doctors, but bad for almost everyone else, who has to pay higher fees 
for medical services. A recent book by Clifford Winston and others3 applies 
a similar argument to the legal profession. Using econometric techniques, 
they estimate that inflated lawyers’ salaries incur an annual welfare cost of 
approximately $10 billion. That is, the regulation of the legal labor market, 
which begins with the ABA accreditation standards, costs society $10 billion in 
higher fees. That $10 billion is spread across the entire legal profession.
So Tamanaha is right to pick on the legal education system. He is 
exclusively concerned with burdening new law graduates with too much debt. 
This concern seems misplaced, given that if law school is in fact a bad deal for 
certain types of people, then those types of people will cease to apply in the 
future. Furthermore, concern for heavily indebted law students—who chose to 
attend law school—seems almost trivial while there are broader social issues, 
such as the unmet legal needs of the lower class. 
Serendipitously, Tamanaha’s suggestions for reform would address various 
negative effects of the legal education system, not just the one he is most 
worried about. A less regulated legal education system would foster low-cost 
legal education options. This would lead to more lawyers willing to work for 
lower wages. Competition in the market for legal services would lead to more 
low-cost legal options. Legal services would become affordable to lower-class 
people who are currently disenfranchised. Government funds devoted to 
legal services, such as support for public defenders, would go farther. Regular 
citizens would pay lower prices for their legal needs. Even the group Tamanaha 
3. Clifford Winston, Robert W. Crandall & Vikram Maheshri, First Thing We Do, Let’s 
Deregulate All the Lawyers (Brookings Institution Press 2011).
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is most concerned about—law school graduates overwhelmed by debt—would 
benefit. Society as a whole would be better off.
